EQUITABLE VOTING RULES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bartholdi, Laurent; Hann-Caruthers, Wade; Josyula, Maya; Tamuz, Omer; Yariv, Leeat
署名单位：
University of Gottingen; California Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California San Diego; Princeton University
刊物名称：
ECONOMETRICA
ISSN/ISSBN：
0012-9682
DOI：
10.3982/ECTA17032
发表日期：
2021
页码：
563-589
关键词：
摘要：
May's theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a weakening of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally. We show that such rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population, but not less than the square root of the population size. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from group theory and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions.