Privacy-Preserving Signals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Strack, Philipp; Yang, Kai Hao
• 署名单位: Yale University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA22017
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1907-1938
• 关键词: Information disclosure; correlated equilibrium; games; persuasion

摘要

A signal is privacy-preserving with respect to a collection of privacy sets if the posterior probability assigned to every privacy set remains unchanged conditional on any signal realization. We characterize the privacy-preserving signals for arbitrary state space and arbitrary privacy sets. A signal is privacy-preserving if and only if it is a garbling of a reordered quantile signal. Furthermore, distributions of posterior means induced by privacy-preserving signals are exactly mean-preserving contractions of that induced by the quantile signal. We discuss the economic implications of our characterization for statistical discrimination, the revelation of sensitive information in auctions and price discrimination.