Bargaining and Exclusion With Multiple Buyers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abreu, Dilip; Manea, Mihai
• 署名单位: New York University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA19675
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 429-465
• 关键词: perfect equilibrium

摘要

A seller trades with q out of n buyers who have valuations a(1) >= a(2) >= center dot center dot center dot >= a(n) > 0 via sequential bilateral bargaining. When q < n, buyer payoffs vary across equilibria in the patient limit, but seller payoffs do not, and converge to max(l <= q+1)[a(1)+a(2)+ center dot center dot center dot+a(l-1)/2+a(l+1)+ center dot center dot center dot+a(q+1)]. If l* is the (generically unique) maximizer of this optimization problem, then each buyer i < l* trades with probability 1 at the fair price a(i)/2, while buyers i >= l* are excluded from trade with positive probability. Bargaining with buyers who face the threat of exclusion is driven by a sequential outside option principle: the seller can sequentially exercise the outside option of trading with the extra marginal buyer q + 1, then with the new extra marginal buyer q, and so on, extracting full surplus from each buyer in this sequence and enhancing the outside option at every stage. A seller who can serve all buyers (q = n) may benefit from creating scarcity by committing to exclude some remaining buyers as negotiations proceed. An optimal exclusion commitment, within a general class, excludes a single buyer but maintains flexibility about which buyer is excluded. Results apply symmetrically to a buyer bargaining with multiple sellers.