Sequentially Stable Outcomes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dilme, Francesc
• 署名单位: University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: ECONOMETRICA
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0012-9682
• DOI: 10.3982/ECTA21402
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1097-1134
• 关键词: Equilibrium selection; EPSILON-EQUILIBRIA; perfect; games

摘要

This paper introduces and analyzes sequentially stable outcomes in extensive-form games. An outcome omega is sequentially stable if, for any epsilon > 0 and any small enough perturbation of the players' behavior, there is an epsilon-perturbation of the players' payoffs and a corresponding equilibrium with outcome close to omega. Sequentially stable outcomes exist for all finite games and are outcomes of sequential equilibria. They are closely related to stable sets of equilibria and satisfy versions of forward induction, iterated strict equilibrium dominance, and invariance to simultaneous moves. In signaling games, sequentially stable outcomes pass the standard selection criteria, and when payoffs are generic, they coincide with outcomes of stable sets of equilibria.