A characterization of game-theoretic solutions which lead to impossibility theorems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jackson, MO; Srivastava, S
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.2307/2298113
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 23-38
• 关键词: proof nash equilibria; undominated strategies; voting schemes; implementation

摘要

For some game-theoretic solution concepts, such as dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium, and undominated strategies, only dictatorial social choice functions are implementable on a full domain of preferences with at least three alternatives. For other solution concepts, such as the iterative removal of weakly dominated strategies, undominated Nash equilibrium, and maximin, it is possible to implement non-dictatorial social choice functions. Which aspects of solution concepts accounts for these differences? We answer this question by providing a characterization of solution concepts which lead to impossibility results.