A pure theory of job security and labour income risk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bertola, G
• 署名单位: University of Turin
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/0034-6527.00275
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 43-61
• 关键词: optimal unemployment-insurance; general equilibrium; COSTS; consumption; INEQUALITY; turnover; search

摘要

Models of labour market equilibrium where forward-looking decisions maximize both profits and labour income on a risk-neutral basis offer valuable insights into the effects of employment protection legislation. Since risk-neutral behaviour in the tabour market presumes perfect insurance, however, job security provisions plays no useful role in such models. This paper studies a stylized model of dynamic tabour market interactions where tabour reallocation costs are partly financed by uninsured workers' consumption flows. In the resulting second-best equilibrium, provisions that shift labour reallocation costs to risk-neutral employers can increase productive efficiency if their administrative dead-weight costs are not too large, and increase workers' welfare as long as employers' firing costs at least partly finance workers' mobility.