Coalition formation with binding agreements
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hyndman, Kyle; Ray, Debraj
署名单位：
Southern Methodist University; New York University
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
0034-6527
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00450.x
发表日期：
2007
页码：
1125-1147
关键词：
摘要：
We study coalition formation in real time, a situation in which coalition formation is intertwined with the ongoing receipt of pay-offs. Agreements are assumed to be permanently binding: They can only be altered with the full consent of existing signatories. For characteristic function games we prove that equilibrium processes-whether or not these are history dependent-must converge to efficient absorbing states. For three-player games with externalities each player has enough veto power that a general efficiency result can be established. However, there exist four-player games in which all Markov equilibria are inefficient from every initial condition, despite the ability to write permanently binding agreements.
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