How to organize crime

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Bar-Isaac, Heski
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00508.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1039-1067
• 关键词: Repeated games; INFORMATION; PROTECTION

摘要

In criminal organizations, diffusing information widely throughout the organization might lead to greater internal efficiency (in particular, since these organizations are self-sustaining, through enhancing trust). However, this may come at the cost of leaving the organization more vulnerable to external threats such as law enforcement. We consider the implications of this trade-off and characterize the optimal information structure, rationalizing both hierarchical structures and organization in cells. Then, we focus on the role of the external authority, characterize optimal detection strategies, and discuss the implications of different forms of enforcement on the internal structure of the organization and policy. Finally, we discuss a number of applications and extensions.