Incentives for Unaware Agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig; Zhao, Xiaojian
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdr050
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1151-1174
• 关键词: 1st-order approach; moral hazard; CONTRACTS; COSTS

摘要

The paper introduces the problem of unawareness into principal-agent theory and discusses optimal incentive contracts when the agent may be unaware of her action space. Depending on the agent's default behaviour, it can be optimal for the principal to propose an incomplete contract (that keeps the agent unaware) or a complete contract. The key trade-off is that of enlarging the agent's choice set versus adding costly incentive constraints. If agents differ in their unawareness, optimal contracts show a self-reinforcing pattern: if there are few unaware agents in the economy optimal contracts promote awareness, if unawareness is wide spread optimal contracts shroud the contracting environment, thus keeping the agent unaware.