Beliefs and Private Monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Phelan, Christopher; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rds009
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1637-1660
• 关键词: repeated prisoners-dilemma; repeated games; equilibria; EFFICIENCY

摘要

This paper develops new recursive, set based methods for studying repeated games with private monitoring. For any finite-state strategy profile, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for whether there exists a distribution over initial states such that the strategy, together with this distribution, form a correlated sequential equilibrium (CSE). Also, for any given correlation device for determining initial states (including degenerate cases where players' initial states are common knowledge), we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the correlation device and strategy to be a CSE, or in the case of a degenerate correlation device, for the strategy to be a sequential equilibrium. We also consider several applications. In these, we show that the methods are computationally feasible, and how to construct and verify equilibria in a secret price-setting game.