Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian; Kim, Jinwoo
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Georgetown University; Seoul National University (SNU)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rds025
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 73-107
• 关键词: public provision; private goods; transfers; utility; cash; strategy; MARKETS; welfare; kind

摘要

This article studies different methods of assigning a good to budget-constrained agents. Schemes that assign the good randomly and allow resale may outperform the competitive market in terms of Utilitarian efficiency. The socially optimal mechanism involves random assignment at a discount-an in-kind subsidy-and a cash incentive to discourage low-valuation individuals from claiming the good.