When to Drop a Bombshell

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gratton, Gabriele; Holden, Richard; Kolotilin, Anton
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdx070
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 2139-2172
• 关键词: Strategic experimentation; signaling games; media bias; INFORMATION; disclosure; news; MARKET

摘要

Sender, who is either good or bad, wishes to look good at an exogenous deadline. Sender privately observes if and when she can release a public flow of information about her private type. Releasing information earlier exposes to greater scrutiny, but signals credibility. In equilibrium bad Sender releases information later than good Sender. We find empirical support for the dynamic predictions of our model using data on the timing of U.S. presidential scandals and U.S. initial public offerings. In the context of elections, our results suggest that October Surprises are driven by the strategic behaviour of bad Sender.