When Is Pure Bundling Optimal?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haghpanah, Nima; Hartline, Jason
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa053
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1127-1156
• 关键词: Simultaneous auctions; price-discrimination; revenue maximization; mechanism design; gaussian demand; commodity; GOODS

摘要

We study when pure bundling, i.e., offering only the grand bundle of all products, is optimal for a multi-product monopolist. Pure bundling is optimal if consumers with higher values for the grand bundle have higher relative values for smaller bundles compared to the grand bundle. Conversely, pure bundling is not optimal if consumers with higher values for the grand bundle have lower relative values. We prove the results by decomposing the problem into simpler ones in which types can be ranked according to their values for the grand bundle.