Shadow Banking and the Four Pillars of Traditional Financial Intermediation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Farhi, Emmanuel; Tirole, Jean
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa059
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2622-2653
• 关键词: liquidity

摘要

Traditional banking is built on four pillars: small and medium enterprise lending, insured deposit taking, access to lender of last resort (LOLR), and prudential supervision. This article unveils the logic of the quadrilogy by showing that it emerges naturally as an equilibrium outcome in a game between banks and the government. A key insight is that regulation and public insurance services (LOLR, deposit insurance) are complementary. The model also shows how prudential regulation must adjust to the emergence of shadow banking and rationalizes structural remedies to counter bogus liquidity hoarding and financial contagion: ring-fencing between regulated and shadow banking and the sharing of liquidity in centralized platforms.