Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke; Westkamp, Alexander
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa052
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1457-1502
• 关键词: college admissions; stable matchings; constraints; CONTRACTS; substitutes; MARKETS

摘要

We characterize when a stable and strategy-proof mechanism is guaranteed to exist in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts. We introduce three novel conditions-observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulability via contractual terms-and show that when these conditions are satisfied, the cumulative offer mechanism is the unique mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof (for workers). Moreover, we show that our three conditions are, in a sense, necessary: if the choice function of some firm fails any of our three conditions, we can construct unit-demand choice functions for the other firms such that no stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists. Thus, our results provide a rationale for the ubiquity of cumulative offer mechanisms in practice.