The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa041
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1503-1540
• 关键词: equilibrium; INDEPENDENCE; mechanisms

摘要

The communication revelation principle (RP) of mechanism design states that any outcome that can be implemented using any communication system can also be implemented by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism. In multistage games, we show that in general the communication RP fails for the solution concept of sequential equilibrium (SE). However, it holds in important classes of games, including single-agent games, games with pure adverse selection, games with pure moral hazard, and a class of social learning games. For general multistage games, we establish that an outcome is implementable in SE if and only if it is implementable in a canonical Nash equilibrium in which players never take codominated actions. We also prove that the communication RP holds for the more permissive solution concept of conditional probability perfect Bayesian equilibrium.