Killer Incentives: Rivalry, Performance and Risk-Taking among German Fighter Pilots, 1939-45

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ager, Philipp; Bursztyn, Leonardo; Leucht, Lukas; Voth, Hans-Joachim
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdab085
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2257-2292
• 关键词: tournaments; awards; neighbors; contests; feedback; prizes; work; rank

摘要

Using newly collected data on death rates and aerial victories of more than 5,000 German fighter pilots during World War II, we examine the effects of public recognition on performance and risk-taking. When a particular pilot is honoured publicly, both the victory rate and the death rate of his former peers increase. Fellow pilots react more if they come from the same region of Germany, or if they worked closely with him. Our results suggest that personal rivalry can be a prime motivating force, and that non-financial rewards can lead to a crowd-in of both effort and risk-taking via social connections.