The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Combe, Julien; Tercieux, Olivier; Terrier, Camille
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; University of Lausanne; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdac002
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 3154-3222
• 关键词: School choice; strategy-proofness; house allocation; EFFICIENCY; STABILITY; determinants; preferences

摘要

To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. We identify a class of strategy-proof mechanisms that cannot be improved upon in terms of both efficiency and fairness. Using a rich dataset on teachers' applications in France, we estimate teachers preferences and perform a counterfactual analysis. The results show that these mechanisms perform much better than the modified version of deferred acceptance. For instance, the number of teachers moving from their positions more than triples under our mechanism.