An Information-based Theory of Financial Intermediation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bethune, Zachary; Sultanum, Bruno; Trachter, Nicholas
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdab092
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 2381-2444
• 关键词: Adverse selection; equity volatility; spreads; MARKET; RISK; ask

摘要

We build a theory of financial intermediation based on the premise that some investors are better able to figure out the trade motives of their counterparties in bilateral meetings-screening experts. We solve for the equilibrium market structure and study how information asymmetries stemming from heterogeneity in screening expertise shape up the core-periphery trade structure. In particular, the core of the market is populated by screening experts: they have the largest share of trade volume, they are actively engaged in middleman activity, and trade with the most counterparties. Using transaction-level micro-data and information disclosure requirements, we provide extensive evidence consistent only with our theory of financial intermediation.