Bargaining as a Struggle Between Competing Attempts at Commitment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dutta, Rohan
• 署名单位: McGill University; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdad106
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2771-2805
• 关键词: perfect equilibrium; MODEL; COOPERATION; DELEGATION; COSTS; delay

摘要

The strategic importance of commitment in bargaining is widely acknowledged. Yet disentangling its role from key features of canonical models, such as proposal power and reputational concerns, is difficult. This paper introduces a model of bargaining with strategic commitment at its core. Following Schelling (1956, The American Economic Review, vol. 46, 281-306), commitment ability stems from the costly nature of concession and is endogenously determined by players' demands. Agreement is immediate for familiar bargainers, modelled via renegotiation-proofness. The unique prediction at the high concession cost limit provides a strategic foundation for the Kalai bargaining solution. Equilibria with delay feature a form of gradualism in demands.