Job Matching with Subsidy and Taxation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kojima, Fuhito; Sun, Ning; Yu, Ning Neil
• 署名单位: University of Tokyo; University of Tokyo; Southern University of Science & Technology; Nanjing Audit University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdad032
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 372-402
• 关键词: Gross substitutes; Walrasian equilibrium; affirmative-action; trading networks; school choice; STABILITY; constraints; MARKETS; auction; allocation

摘要

In markets for indivisible resources such as workers and objects, subsidy and taxation for an agent may depend on the set of acquired resources and prices. This paper investigates how such transfer policies interfere with the substitutes condition, which is critical for market equilibrium existence and auction mechanism performance among other important issues. For environments where the condition holds in the absence of policy intervention, we investigate which transfer policies preserve the substitutes condition in various economically meaningful settings, establishing a series of characterisation theorems. For environments where the condition may fail without policy intervention, we examine how to use transfer policies to re-establish it, finding exactly when transfer policies based on scales are effective for that purpose. These results serve to inform policymakers, market designers, and market participants of how transfer policies may impact markets, so more informed decisions can be made.