When Less Is More: Experimental Evidence on Information Delivery During India's Demonetisation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Banerjee, Abhijit; Breza, Emily; Chandrasekhar, Arun G.; Golub, Benjamin
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Stanford University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdad068
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1884-1922
• 关键词: Social networks; diffusion; pressure; DYNAMICS; MODEL

摘要

In disseminating information, policymakers face a choice between broadcasting to everyone and informing a small number of seeds who then spread the message. While broadcasting maximises the initial reach of messages, we offer theoretical and experimental evidence that it need not be the best strategy. In a field experiment during the 2016 Indian demonetisation, we delivered policy information, varying three dimensions of the delivery method at the village level: initial reach (broadcasting versus seeding); whether or not we induced common knowledge of who was initially informed; and number of facts delivered. We measured three outcomes: the volume of conversations about demonetisation, knowledge of demonetisation rules, and choice quality in a strongly incentivised policy-dependent decision. On all three outcomes, under common knowledge, seeding dominates broadcasting; moreover, adding common knowledge makes seeding more effective but broadcasting less so. We interpret our results via a model of image concerns deterring engagement in social learning, and we support this interpretation with evidence on differential behaviour across ability categories.