Strategic Foundations of Efficient Rational Expectations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barelli, Paulo; Govindan, Srihari; Wilson, Robert
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdad116
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 3190-3216
• 关键词: Information aggregation; equilibrium; EXISTENCE; MARKET

摘要

We study an economy with traders whose payoffs are quasilinear and whose private signals are informative about an unobserved state parameter. The limit economy has infinitely many traders partitioned into a finite set of symmetry classes called types. Market mechanisms in a class that includes auctions yield the same outcome as the Walrasian rational expectations equilibrium if and only if the efficient allocation has a monotonicity property. Examples illustrate cases where they differ. Monotonicity restricts the heterogeneity among traders' types.