Convicting Corrupt Officials: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Cases

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Axbard, Sebastian
• 署名单位: University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae069
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 2271-2302
• 关键词: disability insurance receipt; persistence; audits; politicians; ENFORCEMENT; outcomes; JUSTICE; access; FAMILY; IMPACT

摘要

Can the judiciary help root out government corruption? This article exploits the random assignment of court cases to justices who exhibit varying degrees of strictness to examine how convicting corrupt officials affects local government outcomes in the Philippines. I document that convictions improve the management of local public finances and reduce associated corruption. An exploration of mechanisms suggests that legal deterrence effects contribute to these findings. The results further indicate that convictions are effective at stifling corruption among bureaucrats, but not politicians. Consistent with this heterogeneity, convictions reduce electoral competition and consequently weaken accountability for incumbent politicians.