Public Listing Choice with Persistent Hidden Information

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Celentano, Francesco; Rempel, Mark
• 署名单位: University of Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaf039
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: sarbanes-oxley act; continuous-time; technological-innovation; performance sensitivity; executive-compensation; 1st-order approach; security design; AGENCY COSTS; labor share; PRIVATE

摘要

How much does firm intangibility amplify CEOs' persistent private information and reduce firms' public listing propensity? We develop a model of competing public and private investors financing firms heterogeneously exposed to persistent private cash flows. Equilibrium financing is driven by information rent differentials in CEO compensation. We validate and structurally estimate the model using firm listing and CEO compensation data. We find private (intangible) cash flows exhibit 63% higher persistence than their tangible counterparts. Further, if firm intangibility levels returned to those of 1980, mean listing propensities would increase 5 percentage points while mean CEO variable pay growth would decrease by 61%.