Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Pei, Harry
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaf049
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: cooperation; games; MODEL; folk

摘要

I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players can add or remove signals from their records. The ability to manipulate records introduces monotonicity constraints on players' continuation values, under which sufficiently long-lived players will almost never cooperate. When players' expected lifespans are intermediate, their ability to sustain cooperation depends on (i) whether their actions are complements or substitutes and (ii) whether manipulation takes the form of adding or removing signals.