Endogenous Clustering and Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Jehiel, Philippe; Weber, Giacomo
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London; University of Bologna
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaf054
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: games

摘要

Normal-form two-player games are categorized by players into K analogy classes so as to minimize the prediction error about the behaviour of the opponent. This results in Clustered Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibria in which strategies are analogy-based expectation equilibria given the analogy partitions and analogy partitions minimize the prediction errors given the strategies. We distinguish between environments with self-repelling analogy partitions in which some mixing over partitions is required and environments with self-attractive partitions in which several analogy partitions can arise, thereby suggesting new channels of belief heterogeneity and equilibrium multiplicity. Various economic applications are discussed.