Behavioural Causal Inference

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Spiegler, Ran
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaf050
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: equilibrium; persuasion; models

摘要

When inferring causal effects from correlational data, a common practice by professional researchers but also lay people is to control for potential confounders. Inappropriate controls produce erroneous causal inferences. I model decision-makers (DMs) who use endogenous observational data to learn actions' causal effect on payoff-relevant outcomes. Different DM types use different controls. Their resulting choices affect the very correlations they learn from, thus calling for an equilibrium analysis of the steady-state welfare cost of bad controls. I obtain tight upper bounds on this cost. Equilibrium forces drastically reduce it when types' sets of controls contain one another.