You Will: A Macroeconomic Analysis of Digital Advertising

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Greenwood, Jeremy; Ma, Yueyuan; Yorukoglu, Mehmet
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Koc University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae067
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1837-1881
• 关键词: time

摘要

An information-based model is developed where traditional and digital advertising finance the provision of free media goods and affect price competition. Digital advertising is directed toward specific consumers while traditional advertising is undirected. The equilibrium is suboptimal. Media goods, if valued by the consumer, are under provided with both types of advertising. Additionally, traditional advertising is excessive because it is undirected. The tax-cum-subsidy policy that overcomes these inefficiencies is characterized. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy. Through the lens of the calibrated model, digital advertising increases welfare significantly. The welfare gain from the optimal policy is much smaller than the gain from digital advertising.