Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Piketty, Thomas; Saez, Emmanuel; Stantcheva, Stefanie
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.6.1.230
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 230-271
• 关键词: marginal tax rates; executive-compensation; taxable income; search equilibrium; ceo compensation; pay; HISTORY; luck

摘要

This paper derives optimal top tax rate formulas in a model where top earners respond to taxes through three channels: labor supply, tax avoidance, and compensation bargaining. The optimal top tax rate increases when there are zero-sum compensation-bargaining effects. We present empirical evidence consistent with bargaining effects. Top tax rate cuts are associated with top one percent pretax income shares increases but not higher economic growth. US CEO pay for luck is quantitatively more prevalent when top tax rates are low. International CEO pay levels are negatively correlated with top tax rates, even controlling for firms' characteristics and performance.