Paging Inspector Sands: The Costs of Public Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kapoor, Sacha; Magesan, Arvind
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; University of Calgary
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.6.1.92
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 92-113
• 关键词: report cards; Consumer choice; QUALITY; MARKET; news

摘要

We exploit the introduction of pedestrian countdown signals-timers that indicate when traffic lights will change-to evaluate a policy that improves the information of all market participants. We find that although countdown signals reduce the number of pedestrians struck by automobiles, they increase the number of collisions between automobiles. They also cause more collisions overall, implying that welfare gains can be attained by hiding the information from drivers. Whereas most empirical studies on the role of information in markets suggest that asymmetric information reduces welfare, we conclude that asymmetric information can, in fact, improve it.