Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ujhelyi, Gergely
• 署名单位: University of Houston System; University of Houston
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.6.2.338
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 338-380
• 关键词: POLITICAL CONTROL; patronage; party; aid

摘要

This paper studies the policy impact of civil service regulations, exploiting reforms undertaken by US state governments throughout the twentieth century. These reforms replaced political patronage with a civil service recruited based on merit and protected from politics. I find that state politicians respond to these changes by spending relatively less through the reformed state-level bureaucracies. Instead, they allocate more funds to lower level governments. The reallocation of expenditures leads to reduced long-term investment by state governments.