Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from the Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gil, Ricard
• 署名单位: Johns Hopkins University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20120245
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 162-191
• 关键词: retail gasoline markets; block booking; firm; industry; CONTRACTS; wholesale; OWNERSHIP; ECONOMICS; RIGIDITY; POLICY

摘要

I empirically examine the impact of the 1948 Paramount antitrust case on ticket prices using a unique dataset collected from Variety magazine issues between 1945 and 1955. With information on prices, revenues, and theater ownership for an unbalanced panel of 393 theaters in 26 cities, I find that vertically integrated theaters charged lower prices and sold more admission tickets than nonintegrated theaters. I also find that the rate at which prices increased in theaters was slower while integrated than after vertical divestiture. These findings together with institutional details are consistent with the prediction that vertical integration lowers prices through the elimination of double marginalization.