Cheating and Incentives: Learning from a Policy Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Martinelli, Cesar; Parker, Susan W.; Perez-Gea, Ana Cristina; Rodrigo, Rodimiro
• 署名单位: George Mason University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas A.C. (CIDE); New York University; Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150066
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 298-325
• 关键词: answer copying indexes; academic dishonesty; PREVALENCE; crime

摘要

We use a database generated by a policy intervention that incentivized learning as measured by standardized exams to investigate empirically the relationship between cheating by students and cash incentives to students and teachers. We adapt methods from the education measurement literature to calculate the extent of cheating and show that cheating is more prevalent under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students (versus no incentives or incentives only to teachers). We provide evidence suggesting that students may have learned to cheat, with the number of cheating students per classroom increasing over time under treatments that provide monetary incentives to students.