The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the US Welfare Reform

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bernecker, Andreas; Boyer, Pierre C.; Gathmann, Christina
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190690
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 26-57
• 关键词: status-quo bias; economic-policy; ACCOUNTABILITY; COMPETITION; STATES; resistance; choices

摘要

How do governors' reelection motives affect policy experimentation? We develop a theoretical model of this situation, and then test the predictions in data on US-state-level welfare reforms from 1978 to 2007. This period marked the most dramatic shift in social policy since the New Deal. Our findings indicate that governors with strong electoral support are less likely to experiment than governors with little support. Yet, governors who cannot be reelected actually experiment more than governors striving for reelection. These findings are robust to controlling for ideology, preferences for redistribution, the state legislature, and-cross-state learning.