The Costs of Corporate Tax Complexity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zwick, Eric
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180406
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 467-500
• 关键词: salience; incentives; management; program; FIRMS

摘要

Does tax code complexity alter corporate behavior? We investigate this question by studying the decision to claim refunds for tax losses. In a sample of 1.2 million observations from the population of corporate tax returns, only 37 percent of eligible firms claim their refund. A simple cost-benefit analysis of the tax loss choice cannot explain low take-up, motivating an exploration of how complexity alters this calculation. Research designs exploiting tax preparer switches, deaths, and relocations show that sophisticated preparers increase claim rates for small firms. Imperfect take-up has implications for measuring marginal tax rates and for the design of fiscal policy.