Time Aggregation in Health Insurance Deductibles

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hong, Long; Mommaerts, Corina
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210799
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 270-299
• 关键词: Risk preferences; moral hazard; selection; MODEL

摘要

Health insurance plans increasingly pay for expenses only beyond a large annual deductible. This paper explores the implications of deductibles that reset over shorter timespans. We develop a model of insurance demand between two actuarially equivalent deductible policies in which one deductible is larger and resets annually and the other deductible is smaller and resets biannually. Our model incorporates borrowing constraints , moral hazard , midyear contract switching , and delayable care. Calibrations using claims data show that the liquidity benefits of resetting deductibles can generate welfare gains of 3-10 percent of premium costs , particularly for individuals with borrowing constraints. ( JEL D15, D82, G22, G51, G52, I13 )