Fiscal Rules and the Selection of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Italy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gamalerio, Matteo; Trombetta, Federico
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220325
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 131-164
• 关键词: financial incentives; QUALITY; institutions; DISCRETION; ECONOMY; education; benefits; PARTIES; debt

摘要

Fiscal rules, or constraints on the policymaking discretion of elected officials, are widely used to regulate fiscal policies. Using data on Italian municipalities, we employ a difference-in-discontinuity design to provide evidence of the negative effect of fiscal rules on mayoral candidates' education. Municipalities in which fiscal rules meaningfully restrict the action space of politicians drive the effect. These results are consistent with a formal model of fiscal rules and political selection. We highlight that reducing discretion may affect the composition of the pool of players: It may alleviate pork barrel spending but also negatively affect the education of politicians. (JEL D72, E62, H62, H72)