Do Consumers Distinguish Fixed Cost from Variable Cost? Schmeduling in Two-Part Tariffs in Energy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ito, Koichiro; Zhang, Shuang
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Imperial College London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20230613
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 194-223
• 关键词: information suppression; shrouded attributes; prices evidence; electricity; average; incentives; elasticity; SALIENCE; taxation; respond

摘要

A central assumption in economics is that consumers properly distinguish fixed cost from variable cost. This assumption is fundamental to various economic theories, including optimal taxation, redistribution, and price discrimination. Using a quasi-experiment in heating price reform in China, we find empirical evidence that is inconsistent with this conventional assumption and more consistent with the schmeduling model in Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004). As we demonstrate its policy implications for two-part energy tariffs, this schmeduling behavior makes fixed costs directly relevant to the perceived relative prices of goods, and therefore alters the welfare implications of price, tax, and subsidy designs. (JEL D12, D91, H24, L94, O12, P28, P36)