Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kagel, John H.; Lien, Yuanchuan; Milgrom, Paul
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; California Institute of Technology; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.3.160
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 160-185
• 关键词: Auctions

摘要

We use theory and experiment to explore the performance of multiround, price-guided, combinatorial auctions. We define efficiency-relevant and core-relevant packages and show that if bidders bid aggressively on these and losing bidders bid to their limits, then the auction leads to efficient or core allocations. We study the theoretically relevant behaviors and hypothesize that subjects will make only a few significant bids, and that certain simulations with auto-bidders will predict variations in performance across different environments. Testing the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) design, we find experimental support for these two hypotheses. We also compare the CCA to a simultaneous ascending auction.