Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Keane, Michael P.; Merlo, Antonio
署名单位：
University of Technology Sydney; University of Pennsylvania
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.2.3.186
发表日期：
2010
页码：
186-215
关键词：
摘要：
We assess the impact of a variety of policies that may influence the career decisions of members of the US Congress. These policies alter incentives to run for re-election, run for higher office or leave Congress, by altering wages, non-pecuniary rewards and career prospects (both in and out of Congress). We find that the effect of most policies varies considerably across different types of politicians. For example, a reduction in the congressional wage would disproportionately induce exit from Congress by skilled politicians, Democrats, and politicians who were relatively young when first elected, but not by politicians who most value legislative accomplishments (achievers).
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