Commitment and Conflict in Unanimity Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph
• 署名单位: Hanken School of Economics; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230208
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 206-237
• 关键词: stochastic-model; DISAGREEMENT

摘要

We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision-making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic precommitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a minimum share that they must receive in return for their vote. Such declarations become binding with an exogenously given probability. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) under all q-majority rules. Our results suggest that unanimity rule is uniquely inefficient. All other rules, including