One Man, One Vote

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pancs, Romans; Sharma, Tridib
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230115
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 171-205
• 关键词: representation

摘要

In the United States, electoral districts must be equipopulous. This requirement is known as the one man, one vote doctrine. We propose welfare-based justifications for this requirement under the economic view, according to which voters care about the policy, and under the political view, according to which voters care about representation. Both justifications assume that the districter is partisan. If the districter is benevolent, one man, one vote is harmless under the economic view but may reduce voter welfare under the political view by as much as the reduction from K to root _ K districts would. (JEL D71, D72)