Long-Term Relationships in the US Truckload Freight Industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Harris, Adam; Nguyen, Thi mai anh
• 署名单位: Cornell University; New York University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210343
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 308-353
• 关键词: asset ownership; CONTRACTS; trucking; BUSINESS; DESIGN

摘要

This paper provides evidence on the scope and incentive mechanisms of long-term relationships in the US truckload freight industry. In this setting, shippers and carriers engage in repeated interactions under fixed-rate contracts that allow for inefficient opportunism. The main dynamic mechanism involves shippers using the threat of relationship termination to deter carriers from short-term opportunism. This threat and the potential of future rents induce more carrier cooperation. We test this mechanism against likely alternatives and analyze relationship scope for different carrier types. We find that incentive schemes do not exploit the full temporal and spatial scope of relationships. (JEL D22, D82, L14, L92)