A theory of privatisation

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Boycko, M; Shleifer, A; Vishny, RW
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.2307/2235248
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 309-319
• 关键词: ownership; poland; FIRMS

摘要

Public enterprises around the world have proved to be highly inefficient, primarily because they pursue strategies, such as excess employment, that satisfy the political objectives of politicians who control them. Privatisation of public enterprises can raise the cost to politicians of influencing them, since subsidies to private firms necessary to force them to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain than wasted profits of the state firms. In this way, privatisation leads to efficient restructuring of firms. Moreover, privatisation is more effective when combined with a tight monetary policy, and when the new owners of firms are profit maximising investors, rather than their employees or even managers.