Screening by the company you keep: Joint liability lending and the peer selection effect

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ghatak, M
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00556
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 601-631
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; imperfect information; credit markets; agents

摘要

We look at an economic environment where borrowers have some information about the nature of each other's projects that lenders do not. We show that joint-liability lending contracts, similar to those used by credit cooperatives and group-lending schemes, will induce endogenous peer selection in the formation of groups In a way that the instrument of joint liability can be used as a screening device to exploit this local information. This can improve welfare and repayment rates if standard screening instruments such as collateral are unavailable.