Trust and growth

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zak, PJ; Knack, S
• 署名单位: Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; The World Bank
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00609
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 295-321
• 关键词: Moral hazard; international comparisons; income inequality; COMMITMENT; ORGANIZATION; decisions; set

摘要

Why does trust vary so substantially across countries? This paper presents a general equilibrium growth model in which heterogeneous agents transact and face a moral hazard problem. Agents may trust those with whom they transact, but they also have the opportunity to invest resources in verifying the truthfulness of claims made by transactors. We characterise the social, economic and institutional environments in which trust will be high, and show that low trust environments reduce the rate of investment. The predictions of the model are examined empirically for a cross-section of countries and have substantial support in the data.