The sequential prisoner's dilemma: Evidence on reciprocation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Clark, K; Sefton, M
• 署名单位: University of Manchester; University of Nottingham
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00588
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 51-68
• 关键词: public-goods; free ride; fairness; altruism; MARKET; stakes; game

摘要

we investigate how fairness concerns influence individual behaviour in social dilemmas. Using a Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma experiment we analyse the extent to which co-operation is conditional on first-mover co-operation, repetition, economic incentives, subject pool (United Kingdom vs. United States) and gender. We find the most important variable influencing cooperation is the first-mover's choice, supporting the argument that co-operative behaviour in social dilemmas reflects reciprocation rather than unconditional altruism. However, we also find that cooperation decreases with repetition, and reciprocation falls as its material cost rises.