Central Bank transparency

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Geraats, PM
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00082
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: F532-F565
• 关键词: monetary-policy; inflation targets; credibility; secrecy; DISCRETION; CONTRACTS; uncertainty; INFORMATION; COMMITMENT; reputation

摘要

Central bank transparency has become one of the key features of monetary policy recently. This survey article provides a structured review of the theoretical literature on the consequences of transparency of monetary policy, proposing a distinction between uncertainty and incentive effects of transparency. The theoretical insights are compared to the various ways in which central banks have become transparent in practice. In addition, there is an assessment of the empirical evidence concerning the transparency of monetary policy.