Why social preferences matter - The impact of non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fehr, E; Fischbacher, U
• 署名单位: University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00027
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: C1-C33
• 关键词: Wage rigidity; fairness; unemployment; ECONOMICS; NORMS; game; pay; LAW

摘要

A substantial number of people exhibit social preferences. which means they art not solely motivated 1), material self-interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs of relevant reference agents. We show empirically that economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social preferences, in particular. that without taking social preferences into account, it is not possible to understand adequately (i) effects of competition on market outcomes, (ii) laws governing cooperation and collective action, (iii) effects and the determinants of material incentives, (iv) which contracts and property rights arrangements are optimal, and (v) important forces shaping social norms and market failures.